Introduction
Many chapters in this book have examined distribution and attribution of agency across multiples of people, or people and artifacts. Here though, I look at attribution of agency within persons: how agency, and thus flexibility and accountability, can be distributed across body-or body parts-and self. To do so, I draw on a corpus of video recordings of physical therapy treatment sessions, supplemented with brief examples from recordings made in other settings-so as to illustrate that the phenomena I examine are not peculiar to physical therapy. I demonstrate that people can construct three broad configurations:
1.
The body (or body part) and the self are constructed as agents separate to one another, disaggregated, capable of "independently: acting one upon the other.
2.
The self and body (or body part) are constructed as connected: with the self possessing the body or body part and having an associated control, flexibility, and accountability for bodily actions.
3. The self and body are constructed as one and the same entity and agent: an integrated, accountable, flexible individual.
I describe the seemingly innocuous and subtle interactional practices we use to construct these quite radically different embodiments/identities (Kockelman 2007a ). I will show that we can do so in reference to our own self, or to other persons. The practices describe and illustrate comprise the following:
• Ways that body parts get referred to: whether, for example, we refer to the thumb, or to your or my thumb.
• What we put in the subject and object position of our utterances: for example, whether I say that I do something, or that my leg does something.
• Eye gaze-through which we can show ourselves to be talking to a part of our interlocutor's body-and thus separating it out from a larger whole.
Conversely, we can show that we are talking to the "inner" or whole person by looking him or her in the eye.
• Meanings (i.e., semantics) and metaphors that provide for different configurations of the person, body, and self.
It's worth briefly mentioning that the first practice is available in English but not in all languages-although it seems likely that in different languages, other practices are available to do the same kind of work. It is also worth noticing that these configurations have a dualist character, something I will consider as I go along.
As well as describing how people manage to construct different body/self configurations, I examine when and why they do so. In the context of this book, it should come as no surprise that this has to do with how humans attribute and convey capacity and responsibility for their actions, failings, and endeavors. In a final section, I outline some implications for how we understand and conceptualize distributed agency, and consider how the dualist character of personhood so prevalent in our talk makes sense in social terms. That is, whatever the material discoveries of neuropsychology, and their echoes in linguistic understandings of inalienable possession (Kockelman 2007b) , I am going to show you that when we talk and interact with one another, we do and we can make self and body more, less, or completely-for all practical purposes-separate. Using everyday, mundane language resources, the therapist moves rapidly and seamlessly (lines 1-2) from (a) referring to your pelvis with its implication of a possessive connection between patient's self and body, to (b) formulating the pelvis as a separate agent that is keeping the self of the patient in a particular posture. The second formulation entails referring to the pelvis with the impersonal pronoun it, and doing so in the subject position, with you-the self/patient, in the object position. This subject/object arrangement works to convey the pelvis as an agent, and the self/patient as being acted upon by it. In other words, the therapist constructs a part of the patient's body as a discrete, separate agent that acts upon the self of the patient.
As she continues her description (line 3), the therapist uses different means to separate or distance the self of the patient and his pelvis. The subject/object arrangement is different, the patient-you-is now the subject and thus agent over the shoulders. The distancing here is done through the pronoun the. In extracts to follow, I will demonstrate and examine how people recurrently use impersonals such as the, this, or a when naming a body part, and the way that this distances the body part from the self.
Why do people talk in ways that distance, disaggregate a self and their body (or body parts)? Recurrently, as above, they do so when referring to something that is a problem-an undesirable physical state or movement. By talking in a way that makes the body part a separate agent acting on the self, or in a way that avoids using possessives such as my or your, one can camouflage the connection-sometimes referred to as "inalienable possession"-between the person whose physical state is referred to and his or her body/part. One thereby implies that the person neither controls, nor bears accountability, fault, and responsibility for the undesirable bodily state or action. One can sever, so to speak, the connection-physically as much as psychologically.
The next case once again illustrates use of the rather than your, and also introduces another way people can do this disaggregation: through their gaze patterning. When giving instructions (lines 1 and 3-4), the therapist looks to the back of the patient's hips. She moves on to give a reason for her "this one especially" instruction (lines 6-7).
By the time she starts this talk about a reason, she has shifted her body enough to allow her direct her gaze to the patient's face and make eye contact. Through this patterning, the therapist treats the patient's body and self as separate agents: the body as agent of the 17 T: Yeah. That's-that feels-that feels better to me.
18 P: I got the thumb splint.
(0.7)
20 T: Yeah, and whe-how long are you wearing that for.
The therapist says the thumb (line 10) when your thumb would be equally grammatical, and when it is perfectly clear which of his two thumbs she is referring to. As in the other cases, she does this when referring to a physical shortcoming. The thumb is, for all practical purposes, conveyed as a separate entity at this point: the patient's self and thumb are disaggregated, and this reduces the implication that he is responsible or accountable for the physical failure being talked of. This case also illustrates a counterpart: when she moves into instructions the therapist says, can you take your hand away and [make] more of a space for your thumb. By using your at this juncture, she foregrounds the patient's connection with-in other words, his control over-his hand and thumb. So now, the thumb is portrayed as under the patient's control.
In the physical therapy recordings, both therapists and patients frequently use possessives in situations where controlled, purposeful action is talked about and/or encouraged. Using your or my (when alternatives are possible) treats self and body as connected, and people do so when there is good reason to emphasize someone's control, responsibility, and physical agency in relation to their body.
The rapidity with which one can move between different configurations of the body/self/person relationship is particularly evident in this case, as is the fact that in doing so, a speaker does not need to do anything extra as it were-one does not need to provide talk that, for instance, cancels out an earlier meaning or gives some reason for the change. Here, the patient uses both an impersonal pronoun, a, and a verb phrase that I can't get well. These work to disaggregate her self, as an agent, from her foot-upon which she has been attempting to act. The impersonal pronoun those adds to the conveyed sense of an external view. By line 6, she reaches a further configuration: her whole self is conveyed as ossified.
CASE 8: PHYSICALLY, NOT MENTALLY
Another everyday conversation case comes from a telephone call between friends.
Ava has called Bee, and at the point we enter the call, Bee has been checking with Ava where she is calling from. Erma builds a sense of connection but also a distinction between the inner, private Ilene (behind her-line 6) and Ilene's physical aspect-gorgeous eyes, and a pretty face. This sense is built both through the design of her description-Ilene has physical attributes, and the semantic and metaphoric use of prepositions to indicate this character of selfhood.
TG Ava and Bee, page 15 Line 09 (simplified)

Conclusions
People can allocate to the body, or parts thereof, agency that is more or less separate from the agency of the self. In our social lives at least, while the body and self can be a unified and fused entity, the body and self can also be disaggregated, fissioned, divided. That is, in our interactions, we commit to a form of dualism. This is not a strict "here is body, there is mind" type of dualism, but rather a continuum that can be cut in a variety of places. We commit to this form of dualism as a way of understanding ourselves, our personhood. This enables us to manipulate-to shape-the meaning of our own, and other people's physical successes, failures, and features.
As I have shown above, these kinds of allocation of agency are accomplished via rather basic design features of body movement and talk, including gaze, and grammatical and semantic resources. Through the meanings we thereby build, we can encourage others to hear matters of fault, responsibility, endeavor, and achievement with regard the physical as more or less attributable to the body or body part, or to the "true," "inner" self (the soul, or even the brain). It is noticeable that the more distancing configurations are noticeably charitable-we might even say compassionate; the person talking can absolve the person/self being talked about. Being able to allocate responsibility and even blame for physical problems to the body (and therefore as less-or even not at all-the actual person's fault) helps us to limit negative emotional and relationship consequences of criticizing or blaming another's physical state or behavior. Conversely, being able to convey that positive performances and attributes are integral to the person him-or herself allows us to emphasize that person's personal competence, and thus praise, motivate, and encourage him or her, facilitating alignment in terms of both local actions and the ongoing sense of relationship between the people involved.
My analysis has shown that people locally constitute agency and relations between selves and bodies in a moment to moment way that is fitted to social circumstances and also highly flexible. Previous research that has shown that the way one refers to another person is not random; rather, it does work-it performs social actionssuch as conveying another person as more or less close to the speaker (Enfield and Stivers 2007; Stivers 2007) . My analysis shows that the way we refer to our bodies and our selves is also not a random or haphazard matter, but a socially shaped means of working up distinct embodied identities fitted to interpersonal circumstances and relationships. Finally, the evidence I have presented shows that in order to understand fully the distribution of agency, we need not only to recognize the ways and means through which it can be distributed, fissioned, and fused "across and among individuals" (Enfield 2013:104) , but also to add the recognition that people also distribute agency within individuals.
